We explore the role of the composition of government spending for the cyclical properties of fiscal variables and for the volatility of the business cycles. In the U.S., the fraction of mandatory spending in total government outlays increased from around 0.40 to 0.60 during the last 50 years, while the share of total government outlays in national output stayed relatively constant during this period. We distinguish mandatory and discretionary public spending in a standard model of optimal fiscal policy and show that the composition of government spending is able to explain a fraction of the reduction in output volatility during the Great Moderation and an increase in the countercyclicality of fiscal policy in the U.S. This is another argument in support of the "rules-based" fiscal policy rather than fiscal discretion.
Introduction
The structure of government spending is an important determinant of the impact of fiscal policy on economic outcomes. For example, defense-oriented government spending is likely to enhance the military industry development, while socially-oriented government outlays are likely to expand the public services sector. These two types of spending differ in their impact on the composition of output and employment. The government decision about the allocations of public funds across different spending categories may have long-lasting consequences for the economy.
In this paper we explore the role of the composition of government spending for the cyclical properties of fiscal variables and for the volatility of the business cycle. We consider classification of total government spending in two components: mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary spending is expenditure that is governed by annual or other periodic appropriations (possible examples are defense and public order spending). Mandatory spending is expenditure that is governed by law, rather than by periodic appropriations (possible examples are health care and social security). Different legislative nature of government spending components implies their distinct roles in fiscal policy process. Mandatory spending is taken as given by the government in power (unless the government willingness to enforce the change the laws exceeds the cost of such legislative changes, which we rule out here by assumption). Discretionary spending is a policy tool that can be used by the government in power to maximize its objectives. We incorporate these two government spending components into the neoclassical model with a government that conducts optimal fiscal policy. The model successfully replicates a number of moments from the U.S. data over the period . We use the model to show that: 1) Higher fraction of mandatory public spending in total government spending reduces economic volatility. The historical pattern of mandatory and discretionary government spending in the U.S. can explain 10% of the reduction in output volatility during the Great Moderation. 2) Higher fraction of discretionary spending leads to procyclicality of fiscal policy as documented for developing countries. 3) Higher fraction of mandatory spending leads to acyclicality or countercyclicality of fiscal policy as documented for developed countries.
Accounting for a change in the structure of government spending in the U.S. allows to explain a fraction of the increase in the U.S. fiscal policy countercyclicality during the last 50 years. These findings suggest that fiscal policy rules are superior to discretion and should be enhanced by the policymakers.
In our model, both components of public spending are useful. Discretionary spending is decided by the government and delivers utility to the government but not necessarily to the households. Mandatory spending is enjoyed by the households and is taken as given by the government (it is set by the independent legislation outside the model). We model private consumption and mandatory spending as two components of the effective consumption enjoyed by the household.
Our work is related to several streams of research on the sources of volatility and cyclicality of fiscal policy.
First, our work contributes to the discussion on whether government spending, and discretionary spending in particular, stabilizes or destabilizes output. Fatás and Mihov (2003) provide empirical evidence that governments that intensively rely on discretionary spending induce significant macroeconomic volatility which lowers economic growth. The authors emphasize the importance of political factors in the fiscal policy conduct: institutional arrangements that constrain discretion allow to reduce macroeconomic volatility. Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás (2008) analyze how alternative models of the business cycle can replicate the fact that large governments are associated with less volatile economies (as shown, among others, by Fatás and Mihov, 2001 ). The authors conclude that adding nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to an otherwise standard RBC model can generate a negative correlation between government size and the volatility of output. It this study we are able to generate a negative correlation between a fraction of discretionary spending in total public spending and the volatility of output, given the government size. 1 Azzimonti and Talbert (2014) use the political frictions in the form of political polarization and ideological shifts in the society to explain higher volatility of business cycles in developing economies. We obtain that higher fraction of discretionary public spending in total public spending, other things being equal, leads to both more procyclical fiscal policy and more volatile business cycles.
Fourth, our work is related to the literature on modeling of the cyclical properties of government spending, such as Bachmann and Bai (2013) who match the volatility and persistence of government consumption in the U.S. using a time-consistent model with taste shocks for public consumption and implementation lags and implementation costs in the budgeting process. We do not impose the time-consistency requirement in the model presented in this paper; our robustness checks suggest that the time-consistent policy version (solved under assumptions of Markov strategies by the government and by the representative household) would result in the same qualitative conclusions.
Finally, our results reiterate the theoretical findings by Bowen, Chen and Eraslan (2014) that mandatory spending Pareto dominates discretionary spending under the assumptions generally consistent with characteristics of developed economies. 2 We use a quantitative procedure to show that mandatory spending decreases output volatility and increases countercyclicality of fiscal policy, both of which are usually considered as welfare-enhancing changes.
Thus, our contribution to the existing literature is to quantify the role of the composition of public spending for the cyclical properties of fiscal policy and to compare the impact of discretionary and mandatory public spending on macroeconomic volatility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the pattern of mandatory and discretionary components of government spending and the cyclical properties of several macroeconomic variables in the U.S. before and after the Great Moderation. Section 3 describes the model and its calibration to the U.S. data. Section 4 applies the model to analyze the consequences of a change in the structure of government spending, provides intuition and several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
The Cyclical Properties of Mandatory and Discretionary Spending
In this section we review the characteristics of mandatory and discretionary government spending in the U.S. and present several correlation coefficients that have motivated us to analyze the role of the structure of public spending in the business cycles volatility. We conjecture that higher fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending could be one of the important components of the "rules-based" macroeconomic policy which contributed to macroeconomic stability (similar to the "rule-based" monetary policy as discussed by Taylor, 2012) . The tendency for a country to have less volatile output when the share of mandatory public spending is larger seems to hold not only for the United States. Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the relationship between the GDP volatility over the period 1995-2014 and the average share of the proxy for mandatory spending in total government spending over that period for OECD countries. The proxy for mandatory spending is constructed as the sum of government spending on health, social security and education.
3 These data suggest that countries characterized by lower fraction of mandatory spending in total public spending tend to have higher output volatility.
In further analysis we compare the properties of the U.S. data for the entire period 1962-2014 and for two subperiods -1962-1984 and 1985-2014 -which reflect pre-and post-Great
Moderation years (Stock and Watson, 2003) . Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest.
The information contained in Table 1 can be summarized as follows: 3 We have not found the time-series for exact measure of mandatory spending in OECD countries. In this paper we evaluate the importance of facts 1 and 2 for the explanation of facts 3 and 4 with the help of the model presented in the next section.
The Model
The model represents a version of the neoclassical model with government and with a distinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending. The government finances public spending with a flat rate income tax and issues of risk-free public bonds. Below, the economy is described in more detail.
The economic environment
The model economy is inhabited by infinitely-lived households; time is discrete. A representative household derives utility from private consumption, c t and from (possibly a fraction of) government spending; it dislikes labor, l t , and is endowed by one unit of time every period. Total government spending, G t , consists of mandatory spending, m t , and discretionary spending, g t . Mandatory spending is governed by legislation and its law of motion is taken as given by the households and by the government. This category of spending may include health, education, and other social benefits. Discretionary spending is governed by periodic appropriations, through the decision of the government as a part of fiscal policy. This category of spending may include expenditures on defence, public order, and justice. Following Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), we may refer to mandatory spending as "merit goods" and to discretionary spending as "public goods".
The households enjoy consumption of "merit goods" (mandatory spending) as well as their private consumption. In particular, we assume the Cobb-Douglas form for the effective household consumption as follows:
There are several possible interpretations for the mission of "public goods" (discretionary spending) g t , which result from the fact that this type of spending can be chosen by the government.
First, we could think of discretionary public spending as providing utility to the representative household and of a benevolent government that seeks to maximize households'
welfare by choosing the level of discretionary spending.
Second, we could think of discretionary public spending as providing the opportunity to the government to collect private rent. The simplest way to reflect such situation in a model is to assume that "public goods" deliver utility to the government but not to the households. Such political friction caused by weak institutions has been widely discussed in the literature and has been shown to lead to procyclical government spending (see, for example, Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008).
Third, we could think of the existence of different types of discretionary public spending which provide utility to different groups of households in a society characterized by polarized preferences about the composition of public goods. In order to add such political friction, called political polarization, to the model, we could assume, among other things, that the party in power maximizes the utility of its electorate -the group of households that shares the preferences of that party. Political polarization has been shown to lead to procyclical government spending (Woo, 2009 ) and more volatile business cycles (Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014).
The complete models of public rent-seeking or political polarization would require additional assumptions and model ingredients 5 which are not of the main interest in this paper. Therefore, we consider the first interpretation as the baseline but we keep in mind that the second and third interpretations are also relevant. We assume (consistent with all three cases) that the utility from discretionary public spending is separable from the utility from private consumption, mandatory public spending, and leisure, and has a weight ϕ g ∈ [0, 1) in the total utility of the household. We use the following function for the total instantaneous utility of the household:
where ϕ c , ϕ l > 0.
The economy's physical capital stock at period t, k t−1 , is owned by the representative household which supplies it together with labor to the competitive firm, receiving interest, r t , for each unit of capital and wage, w t , for each unit of labor in return. Physical capital depreciates at rate δ. The household can also save in the form of risk-free government bonds, b t , which, purchased in period t at price p t , deliver the amount of b t of consumption goods in period t + 1. The holdings of government bonds involve a quadratic transaction cost proportional to the amount of bonds purchased, φb 2 t , φ > 0. This cost is rebated back to the household as a lump-sum transfer (the presence of debt transaction cost rules out non-stationary debt dynamics). We assume, without loss of generality, that the economy starts with zero public debt, b −1 = 0. The total household income is subject to the proportional income tax, τ t .
The competitive firm operates the constant returns to scale production function which combines capital and labor to produce output, y t . In particular, we assume the CobbDouglas production function:
where A t denotes stochastic technology which follows the law of motion specified below.
Given government policy, a representative household chooses its consumption, labor, and savings to maximize its expected lifetime utility, given by the sum of expected instantaneous utilities (2), discounted by the impatience parameter β ∈ (0, 1), subject to the budget constraint:
The optimality conditions corresponding to the household's problem consist of (4) together with the following equations:
Given the competitive markets, the prices of capital and labor are equal to their marginal products:
The resource constraint of the economy is as follows:
We approximate the exogenous states of the economy, the level of technology A t and the level of mandatory public spending m t , by the autoregressive processes of order one (AR (1)). In particular, we assume that the logarithm of technology follows an AR (1) process with mean lnĀ, autocorrelation coefficient ρ A , and volatility σ 
and the logarithm mandatory public spending follows an AR(1) process with mean ln(mḠ), wherem is the average fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending andḠ is the average total government spending in the economy, autocorrelation coefficient ρ m , and volatility σ 
We can define the competitive equilibrium in this economy given the government policy, the initial capital stock, k −1 , and the exogenous processes A t and m t , as a sequence of prices {p t , r t , w t }, allocations {c t , l t }, capital stocks k t , and public bonds issues b t , such that: given prices, the households maximize their expected lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint (4); competitive firms maximize their profits; and the resource contraint of the economy given by (10) is satisfied.
The government policy
The problem of the benevolent government is to set the income taxes and the amount of risk-free bonds b t to issue at time t and be repaid at time t + 1 in order to finance a stream of government spending, thereby maximizing its objective. As discussed above, we assume that the instantaneous utility of the government coincides with the utility of the households. The law of motion of mandatory public spending is determined outside the model and is taken as given by the government. The amount of discretionary public spending adjusts to equilibrate the government budget, which takes the following form:
For simplicity, we assume that the government is able to commit to a fiscal plan developed for the long term 6 and cannot default on its debt obligations. Thus, at the initial period of the economy life, the government chooses the sequence of income taxes (or, equivalently, the level of discretionary expenditures) and issues of risk-free public bonds for every period, given the expectations about the possible states of the economy.
We can define the Ramsey problem of the government as a sequence of taxes and public bond issues that maximizes the expected lifetime utility of the government over the competitive equilibria.
It is convenient to formulate the problem of the government in terms of the choice of household allocations (see appendix for details) as follows:
where discretionary government spending has been substituted away using (10) . The optimality conditions for the government problem are as follows:
where µ t and η t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (15) and (16), respectively.
In the deterministic steady state, the optimal fiscal policy is to keep public debt at zero and to use tax receipts to finance public spending. In the presence of uncertainty, the government bonds are used to partially smooth fluctuations in the economy. The level of public debt at the stochastic steady state is finite (due to the presence of the debt transaction cost) and can be positive or negative, depending on the utility parameters.
The discretionary component of public spending is distortionary: its size (captured by its marginal utility) affects both the levels of allocations and their cyclical properties.
In the next section, we proceed with the calibration of the model economy to evaluate the importance of the structure of government spending for the cyclical properties of macroeconomic variables.
Calibration
We consider the U.S. data for the period 1962-2014 as the baseline for calibration. Additionally, we split the data in two subperiods, before and after 1985, to account for the change in macroeconomic volatility between these two subperiods. For the model calibration, we distinguish four sets of the model parameters: for v c and v l ). We discuss the alternative sets of these parameters in the robustness checks.
The calibration procedure is as follows.
First, we set the discount factor β = 0.96 and the capital share α = 0.36. We choose ρ A , σ , and ρ m , σ ε to match the Solow residual from the production function (3) and the mandatory government spending, respectively, in the U.S. for the period 1962-2014 (both series de-trended using differences of logarithms).
Second, we select the following parameters to match the deterministic steady state in the baseline economy (covering the data for 1962-2014): We chooseĀ to normalize the model-generated output at the deterministic steady state to one. We choose δ to match We de-trend all the variables in the data and in the model using the differences of logarithms. We use the optimality conditions to approximate the model around the steady state (with the help of DYNARE) and rely on the model dynamics around the steady state to compute the moments of interest.
The parameters of the model and the calibration targets are summarized in Table 2; the model-generated moments together with corresponding moments for the U.S. data are reported in Table 3 . The model successfully captures the sign of the correlations with output for all the variables except of the tax receipts (which are acyclical in the data and countercyclical in the model). Moreover, the strength of the relationship among the variables measured by the absolute value of the correlation is also accounted by the model fairly well. The volatility of the model-generated variables is lower than the volatility of these variables in the data. The relative volatilities are captured by the model relatively well for investment (about three times more volatile than output both in the model and in the data) and total government spending (2.8 times more volatile than output in the model and 2.2 times more volatile that output in the data). The volatility of public debt is much lower than in the data and the volatility of labor hours is twice as high as in the data.
Given that the model relatively successfully replicates the pattern of the moments of interests (in particular, the correlation between G and Y and the relative variances of the data), we proceed by applying this model to the analysis of the effect of a change in the structure of government spending which occurred in the U.S. during the 1980s and which is reported in Figure 1 . and for around 60% of total government outlays after 1985. At the same time, the total government spending as a share of GDP remained relatively constant during this period.
We ask whether these facts, incorporated in the model, can account for the change in the characteristics of the U.S. data described in Section 2.
In order to evaluate the role of the structure of public spending in these observations, we simulate the model by settingm = 0.4Ḡ andm = 0.6Ḡ, keeping G/y constant to match the respective data in the U.S. before and after 1985. Table 4 present the results generated by the model and corresponding moments in the data. The model moments are obtained from the model simulations around the steady state given parameter values reported in Table 2 The results suggest that the distinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending in the optimal fiscal policy model allows to account for a fraction of the reduction in output volatility during the Great Moderation in the U.S.: volatility of output decreases by 47% in the data and by 4.4% in the model. The volatility of most of the remaining variables in the model also follows the trend in the data: investment, discretionary spending, and labor hours are less volatile when mandatory public spending is higher, while the volatility of public debt and taxes increases with higher fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending. The exceptions are the private consumption and the total government spending: their volatility decreases (for C) or stays constant (for G) in the data but increases in the model. One possible reason for the contradictory prediction regarding the public spending volatility is that the mandatory spending by construction is equally volatile in the model before and after 1985, while in the data its volatility decreases after 1985. Imposing a smaller variance on the mandatory spending process after 1985 would enhance the decline in macroeconomic volatility (in particular, it would reduce the volatility of output, private consumption, and discretionary public spending).
The model also accounts for a rise in the countercyclicality of total government spending: comparing the periods before and after an increase in the fraction of mandatory spending (before and after 1985) the correlation between G and Y decreases from -0.17 to -0.47 in the data and from -0.42 to -0.46 in the model.
Intuitively, the cyclicality of total government spending depends on the cyclical properties of its components: discretionary and mandatory spending. A rise in mandatory public spending act as a negative shock to output: more resources have to be devoted to mandatory government consumption, and less to the other spending components including discretionary spending and investment in physical capital. Thus, mandatory spending and output are negatively correlated and a larger fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending decreases procyclicality (or increases countercyclicality) of fiscal policy.
Discretionary public spending distorts equilibrium allocations, reducing the ability of the other government tools to smooth the effect of fluctuations on the economy. This can be seen from the optimality conditions to the government problem, presented in the appendix:
reducing the fraction of distortionary public spending is equivalent to reducing the marginal utility from public spending (through a reduction in the parameter reflecting preferences for distortionary spending captured by ϕ g ), which in turn reduces the public-effective household consumption wedge and labor-public consumption wedge, increasing the ability of the government to use taxes to smooth consumption, labor, and, consequently, capital accumulation. The latter implies an important result: Keeping total government share of GDP constant and increasing mandatory spending leads to higher consumption, labor, capital, and output at the new stochastic steady state. 7 Our numerical experiments suggest that the parameters capturing the inverses of elasticities, v c , v l , and v g , influence the first moments in a non-trivial way. In particular, more elastic public consumption (lower v g ) is more distortionary, in the sense that it leads to lower output at the stochastic steady state, other things being equal. In contrast, more elastic effective private consumption (lower v c )
implies that discretionary public spending is less distortionary, leading to greater output at the stochastic steady state, other things being equal. Together, the relative elasticities of the utility components define, in a highly nonlinear way, the cyclical properties of fiscal variables (see Grechyna, 2015 for the related discussion of the cyclical properties of a model economy without physical capital).
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that the model-generated investment share, 
Intuition and Robustness Checks
In order to gain more insights into the dependence of the model outcomes on model assumptions, we consider the role of the main building blocks of the model in more detail.
The Role of the Shocks
First, we analyze the role of the exogenous shocks. Figures 3 and 4 present the impulseresponse functions to one standard deviation positive shock to technology and mandatory government spending, respectively. Each of the two shocks leads to a fall in labor hours and taxes, and a rise in total government spending, discretionary spending, and public debt.
The effect on output, private consumption, and investment is positive for a technology shock and negative for a government spending shock, as expected. An increase in the fraction of mandatory spending reduces the effect of each of the shocks on output, investment, and private consumption -reflecting a reduction in the distortionary component of public spending.
In order to investigate which shock has more importance for the cyclical properties of fiscal variables, we consider two sub-versions of the baseline economy, which we denote by M 0 , as follows:
M 0,A : the model with σ ε = 0, and all the other parameter values from Table 2 . This model has only one exogenous shock -shock to technology.
M 0,m : the model with σ = 0, and all the other parameter values from Table 2 . This model has only one exogenous shock -shock to mandatory public spending.
We compare the change in the volatility and correlations of the variables generated by models M 0,A and M 0,m as we move fromm = 0.4 tom = 0.6. The signs of the changes in these moments are reported in the third and fourth rows of Table 5 . The first two 
The Role of the Utility Parameters
In the baseline model we calibrated the parameters capturing the elasticities of substi- We consider several variations of these parameters, usually applied in the literature (with the values of all the remaining parameters set as described in Table 2 ):
This is the case of utility logarithmic in all the arguments.
These are the typical parameter values for CRRA utility of the form considered in this paper. The parameter for public consumption is set given that its estimates in developed countries vary between 0.8 and 1.1 (Debortoli and Nunes, 2013). 
The Role of the Effective Consumption Function
We evaluate the importance of non-separability between private consumption and mandatory spending for the cyclical properties of the model economy by considering the following sub-version of the model (with the values of all the remaining parameters set as described in Table 2 ):
In this case the utility from private consumption is independent from the mandatory spending. The only way this spending influences the economy is through the resource constraint. Table 5 with γ < 1. This form of effective consumption is less restrictive than the Cobb-Douglas form considered in the baseline model; it allows to evaluate the importance of the degree of substitutability/complementarity between private consumption and mandatory public spending. We consider two subcases (with the values of all the remaining parameters set as described in Table 2 ):
M 4,1 : γ = 0.5 (private and public consumption are substitutes).
M 4,2 : γ = −0.5 (private and public consumption are complements).
The behavior of the second moments is summarized in Table 5 The CES effective consumption function adds another parameter to the model, γ, and allows to generate a wider range of the values for the correlations between total government spending and output. In particular, varying γ (in the range γ < 0, to generate the moments consistent with the data) allows to achieve various degrees of pro-or countercyclicality of fiscal policy. Intuitively, a rise in the mandatory public spending act as a negative government spending shock: more resources have to be devoted to government consumption, thus output decreases. Given that mandatory spending is complementary to private consumption, private consumption declines in response to a negative shock to mandatory spending. Therefore, a larger fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending decreases procyclicality (or increases countercyclicality) of fiscal policy and reduces positive correlation between consumption and output. In Figure 5 we plot the model-generated correlation between the total government spending G and output y (both series detrended by the differences of logarithms) as a function of the degree of complementarity and the weight attached to the private consumption. The higher the complementarity between private consumption and mandatory spending (captured by the parameter γ) is, the lower the correlation between output and public spending is. Keeping the complementarity parameter constant, the higher the share of private consumption in total effective household consumption (captured by the parameter ρ) is, the higher the correlation between output and public spending is. By varying these two parameters of the effective consumption, we can achieve any correlation level, which in principle could match the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in any country given the fraction of mandatory public spending in the country. In particular, we can generate procyclical fiscal policies when ρ is high (mandatory spending does not contribute much to the household utility) and countercyclical fiscal policy when ρ is relatively low.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a stylized model of optimal fiscal policy with a distinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending. We showed that higher fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending leads to less volatile business cycles and reduces procyclicality of fiscal policy. Our findings reiterate on the importance of "rules-based" policy for economic stability and welfare.
We have considered several variations of the model economy described in this paper;
our conclusions remain robust. In particular, the absence of public debt or the absence of government commitment to its fiscal plan does not affect the qualitative features of the model economy described in this paper.
